This paper reports a study of the key success factors of what have been recognized as successful service enterprises in China, each considered representative of its respective industry. The grounded theory approach was used to analyze information collected from these enterprises, resulting in the identification of the attributes shared by these enterprises: customer-oriented service, service management, service innovation, and corporate social responsibility. Based on these attributes, a survey was conducted to verify the relationships among these attributes and important outcomes, namely (...) customer satisfaction, perceived service quality, and enterprise reputation. The results of the statistical analysis indicate that the four attributes have positive impacts on service outcomes. The findings are of far-reaching importance in view of the vast potential service markets in China. (shrink)

Auditory perception is traditionally conceived as the perception of sounds — a friend’s voice, a clap of thunder, a minor chord. However, daily life also seems to present us with experiences characterized by the absence of sound — a moment of silence, a gap between thunderclaps, the hush after a musical performance. In these cases, do we positively hear silence? Or do we just fail to hear, and merely judge or infer that it is silent? This longstanding question remains controversial (...) in both the philosophy and science of perception, with prominent theories holding that sounds are the only objects of auditory experience and thus that our encounter with silence is cognitive, not perceptual. However, this debate has largely remained theoretical, without a key empirical test. Here, we introduce a novel empirical approach, presenting experimental evidence that silence can be genuinely perceived (not just cognitively inferred). We ask whether silences can ‘substitute’ for sounds in event-based auditory illusions — empirical signatures of auditory event representation in which auditory events distort perceived duration. Seven experiments introduce three new ‘silence illusions’ — the one-silence-is-more illusion, silence-based warping, and the oddball-silence illusion — each adapted from a prominent perceptual illusion previously thought to arise only from sounds. Subjects were immersed in ambient noise interrupted by silences structurally identical to the sounds in the original illusions. In all cases, silences elicited temporal distortions perfectly analogous to the illusions produced by sounds. Our results suggest that silence is truly heard, not merely inferred, introducing a general approach for studying absence perception. (shrink)

This article considers how the I furnishes a ground for the moral principle’s reality or applicability, or the synthetic unification of the higher and the lower powers of desire, through its originally determined nature. It argues that the nature of I-hood as an immediate unity of seeing and being, an absolute identity of the subjective and objective, is key to securing the moral principle’s applicability. On its basis, Fichte envisages an originally determined system of drives and feelings on the one (...) side, and of ends on the other, in and through which each of our dutiful actions in each given situation is determined. For Fichte, the question of the moral law’s application has more to do with demonstrating the moral law’s applicability as a principium executionis (or what is the same, the real, practical efficacy of reason) than with employing the law as a discursive criterion for deciding whether actions are dutiful or not. The article clarifies this point by reference to Rehberg’s critique of Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

In this work we investigate the Weihrauch degree of the problem Decreasing Sequence of finding an infinite descending sequence through a given ill-founded linear order, which is shared by the problem Bad Sequence of finding a bad sequence through a given non-well quasi-order. We show that $\mathsf {DS}$, despite being hard to solve, is rather weak in terms of uniform computational strength. To make the latter precise, we introduce the notion of the deterministic part of a Weihrauch degree. We then (...) generalize $\mathsf {DS}$ and $\mathsf {BS}$ by considering $\boldsymbol {\Gamma }$ -presented orders, where $\boldsymbol {\Gamma }$ is a Borel pointclass or $\boldsymbol {\Delta }^1_1$, $\boldsymbol {\Sigma }^1_1$, $\boldsymbol {\Pi }^1_1$. We study the obtained $\mathsf {DS}$ -hierarchy and $\mathsf {BS}$ -hierarchy of problems in comparison with the Baire hierarchy and show that they do not collapse at any finite level. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealing to the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises because traditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannot do wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lack significant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and the redeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, if significant freedom is not intrinsically (...) valuable, then Plantinga’s reply to the logical problem of evil fails. In this paper, we assess three contemporary solutions to the dilemma above. The first is the love solution, which proposes that significant freedom is necessary for agents to love, and loving others is intrinsically good. The second is the soul-making solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for self-developing one’s moral character, and having a self-developed moral character is intrinsically good. The third is the derivative free will solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for derivative free will in heaven, and derivative free will is intrinsically good. We raise problems against all three solutions and instead defend a fourth solution – the ultimate responsibility solution. That is, significant freedom is instrumentally valuable as it gives agents ultimate responsibility with regards to morally significant acts. Finally, we defend the ultimate responsibility solution against two major objections. (shrink)

Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. (...) While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion note on Isaacs et al. (2022), who have claimed to offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities, based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurability. In this note, I clarify some consequences of their proposal. In particular, I show that if their proposal is applied to a bounded 3-dimensional space, then they have to reject at least one of the following: (i) If A is at most as probable as B and B is at most as (...) probable as C, then A is at most as probable as C. (ii) Let A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅. A is at most as probable as B iff (A ∪ C) is at most as probable as (B ∪ C). But rejecting either statement seems unattractive. (shrink)

Background Participants' understanding of clinical trials is important in informed consent. However, little is known about what information participants really want to know. Aims To demonstrate the existence of a discrepancy between participants' understanding and their desire to know. Methods The participants in clinical trials at Seoul National University Hospital were surveyed. The survey consisted of 11 statements based on the essential elements of informed consent. The participants gave two responses to each statement on a five-point Likert scale to rate (...) their subjective understanding and desire to know, respectively. Information discrepancy was defined as the difference between these two ratings: if understanding exceeded desire to know for a particular item, it was defined as ‘over-informed’; if desire to know exceeded understanding for a particular item, it was defined as ‘under-informed’. Results Participants reported good understanding of ‘voluntariness’, ‘duration’, ‘study involves research’ and poor understanding of ‘confidentiality’, ‘compensation’, ‘benefits’, ‘procedures’ and ‘risks or discomforts’. For ‘risks or discomforts’, ‘who to contact’, ‘voluntariness’, ‘duration’ and ‘procedures’, participants reported high desire to know compared with ‘confidentiality’, ‘purpose’, ‘study involves research’ and ‘benefits’. The elements ‘study involves research’, ‘voluntariness’, ‘duration’, ‘purpose’ and ‘who to contact’ were over-informed, while ‘compensation’, ‘risks or discomforts’, ‘procedures’, ‘confidentiality’ and ‘benefits’ were under-informed. Participants over 50 years of age, those without a college education and those whose participation was less voluntary were relatively less informed about the clinical trials. Conclusions An information discrepancy was observed between the participants' understanding and their desire to know. By putting more emphasis on under-informed elements, the quality of informed consent could be improved. (shrink)

In _The Deconstruction of Sex_, Jean-Luc Nancy and Irving Goh discuss how a deconstructive approach to sex helps us negotiate discourses about sex and foster a better understanding of how sex complicates our everyday existence in the age of #MeToo. Throughout their conversation, Nancy and Goh engage with topics ranging from relation, penetration, and subjection to touch, erotics, and jouissance. They show how despite its entrenchment in social norms and centrality to our being-in-the-world, sex lacks a clearly defined essence. At (...) the same time, they point to the potentiality of literature to inscribe the senses of sex. In so doing, Nancy and Goh prompt us to reconsider our relations with ourselves and others through sex in more sensitive, respectful, and humble ways without bracketing the troubling aspects of sex. (shrink)

This article reports the results of a survey, by mailed questionnaire, of the attitudes, values and practices of doctors in Singapore with respect to the doctor-patient relationship. Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 475 doctors (261 general practitioners and 214 medical specialists), out of which 249 (52.4%) valid responses were completed and returned. The survey is the first of its kind in Singapore. Questions were framed around issues of medical paternalism, consent and patient autonomy. As the doctors were (...) exposed to Western ethical concepts in their training, we were not surprised to find that they would mostly allow patients some say in decision-making and keep patients reasonably informed. In respecting patient autonomy, they would usually seek to influence patient choice by persuasion. However, the residual "Asian-ness" of doctors in Singapore gives rise to some inconsistencies between values and practices. Many doctors still believe that a number of their patients are incapable of rational choice. There is some lack of openness in telling patients the whole truth. When patients choose to refuse treatment, many doctors are prepared to involve family members in making a consensus decision. Doctors were also asked how they made ethical judgements in the face of dilemmas, and how they would like disputes with patients to be resolved. By and large, the doctors prefer to make their own judgements rather than to rely on rules. They also wish to keep the law courts out of disputes with patients, preferring less public ways of settling disputes. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion-theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed iterations of the Turing jump but below ATR $_{0}$. There is a long history of proof-theoretic principles which are THAs. Until the papers reported on in this communication, there was only one mathematical example. Barnes, Goh, and Shore [1] analyze an array of ubiquity theorems in graph theory descended from Halin’s [9] work on rays in graphs. They (...) seem to be typical applications of ACA $_{0}$ but are actually THAs. These results answer Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics [19] and supply several other natural principles of different and unusual levels of complexity.This work led in [25] to a new neighborhood of the reverse mathematical zoo: almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own are very weak. Denizens both mathematical and logical are provided. Generalizations of several conservativity classes are defined and these ATHAs as well as many other principles are shown to be conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion-theoretic ways as well. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in [19] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

Halin in 1965 proved that if a graph has [Formula: see text] many pairwise disjoint rays for each [Formula: see text] then it has infinitely many pairwise disjoint rays. We analyze the complexity of this and other similar results in terms of computable and proof theoretic complexity. The statement of Halin’s theorem and the construction proving it seem very much like standard versions of compactness arguments such as König’s Lemma. Those results, while not computable, are relatively simple. They only use (...) arithmetic procedures or, equivalently, finitely many iterations of the Turing jump. We show that several Halin-type theorems are much more complicated. They are among the theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. Such theorems imply the ability to iterate the Turing jump along any computable well ordering. Several important logical principles in this class have been extensively studied beginning with work of Kreisel, H. Friedman, Steel and others in the 1960s and 1970s. Until now, only one purely mathematical example was known. Our work provides many more and so answers Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics in 2011. Some of these theorems including ones in Halin in 1965 are also shown to have unusual proof theoretic strength as well. (shrink)

"FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. It is co-edited by Daniel Breazeale and David W. Wood, with associate editor Kienhow Goh. -/- .

This issue 23 of FICHTEANA is dedicated to Daniel Breazeale, who passed away on 30 December 2023. -/- "FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an annual online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. Editors: Daniel (...) Breazeale (†) and David W. Wood; with associate editors Kienhow Goh and Gesa Wellmann. -/- . (shrink)

China’s phenomenal economic development since 1979 has caught the attention and envy of the rest of the world. 500 million Chinese have been lifted out of poverty since then.1 Yet, it has come with a huge price which threatens not only China but the rest of the world. These challenges include corruption, environmental issues, social inequalities and a rapidly aging population. If China is not able to overcome any of these, then its development will not be sustainable and the impact (...) will be immensely negative just as its development over the last three decades have been positive on the rest of the world. The purpose of this article is to show that there is a little-known transformation happening in China which may address the above issues. It is the thesis of the author that China’s present developmental challenges are fundamentally a problem of misplaced values, i.e. unsustainable priorities. And the little known transformation is that tens of millions of Chinese are quickly embracing a new set of values and accepting a biblical worldview.2 Rodney Stark, socialogist and popular author, has shown through his many works, such as For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery,3 that societies which have espoused the monotheistic belief system are able to successfully overcome similar social challenges and remain viable. (shrink)

In a fair finite lottery with n tickets, the probability assigned to each ticket winning is 1/n and no other answer. That is, 1/n is unique. Now, consider a fair lottery over the natural numbers. What probability is assigned to each ticket winning in this lottery? Well, this probability value must be smaller than 1/n for all natural numbers n. If probabilities are real-valued, then there is only one answer: 0, as 0 is the only real and non-negative value that (...) is smaller than 1/n for all natural numbers n. However, this answer seems counter-intuitive, as it violates Regularity: for all possible events A that are assigned a probability, A is assigned a positive probability. It is possible for ticket i to win in the second lottery. So, the set {i} should be assigned a positive probability and not 0. Consequently, in order to satisfy Regularity, probabilities must be allowed to take on `non-real' values, e.g. a positive infinitesimal x that is smaller than 1/n for all natural numbers n. So, what regular probability is assigned to {i} in the second lottery? This probability value must be positive but smaller than 1/n for all natural numbers n. Given the definition of x, x is a correct answer. But x isn't unique, because every other positive infinitesimal is a correct answer as well and there are uncountably many positive infinitesimals. After all, every positive infinitesimal is strictly between 0 and 1/n for all natural numbers n. Nothing about a fair lottery over the natural numbers uniquely determines x as the correct answer and nothing about the lottery rules out other positive infinitesimals as a correct answer as well. What probability to assign to {i} is underdetermined. -/- In this thesis, I explore this difference between fair finite lotteries and fair infinite lotteries. The constraints governing the former uniquely determine the probabilities assigned to events in those lotteries, but this isn't true for the latter lotteries, when Regularity is a constraint on probabilities. Now, although there are uncountably many correct probability values that can be assigned to {i} in the second lottery, there are some applications of probability theory, for which at least one correct probability value must be chosen in order to accomplish that application, e.g. calculation of expected utilities. In this thesis, I spell out sufficient conditions for when a choice like that is problematic. These conditions apply to precise probabilities, imprecise probabilities, and qualitative probabilities. So, I will consider Benci et al. (2018)'s and Pruss (2021)'s suggestion of allowing probabilities to be imprecise, as well as resorting to qualitative probabilities, to overcome the choice problem. I will argue that both don't solve the problem. Furthermore, there's a hitherto unnoticed difficulty in deriving imprecise probabilities by supervaluating over precise `non-real' probability values. To avoid this difficulty, precise probability values should be real-valued. Thus, Regularity cannot be a constraint on probabilities. But as it turns out, dropping Regularity as a constraint and requiring precise probabilities to be real-valued solve the choice problem. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy stands as one of the great French theorists of "deconstruction." His writings on philosophy, politics, aesthetics, and religion have significantly contributed to the development of contemporary French thought and helped shape and transform the field of continental philosophy. Through Nancy's immense oeuvre, which covers a wide range of topics such as community, freedom, existence, sense/ touch, democracy, Christianity, the visual arts and music, and writing itself, we have learned to take stock of the world in a more nuanced (...) fashion. In this collection, contemporaries of Nancy and eminent scholars of continental philosophy, including Giorgio Agamben, Étienne Balibar, Ginette Michaud, Georges Van Den Abbeele, Gregg Lambert and Ian James, have been invited to reflect on the force of Nancy's "deconstruction" and how it has affected, or will affect, the ways we approach many of the most pertinent topics in contemporary philosophy. The collection also includes Jean-Luc Nancy's previously unpublished 'Dialogue Beneath the Ribs', where he reflects, twenty years after, on his heart transplant. Nancy Now will be of critical interest not only to scholars working on or with Nancy's philosophy, but also to those interested in the development and future of French thought. (shrink)

In the selection of job candidates who have the mental ability to become professional ATCOs, psychometric testing has been a ubiquitous activity in the ATM domain. To contribute to psychometric research in the ATM domain, we investigated the extent to which spatial orientation ability (SOA), as conceptualized in the spatial cognition and navigation literature, predicted air traffic conflict detection performance in a simulated free route airspace (FRA) environment. The implementation of free route airspace (FRA) over the past few years, notably (...) in Europe, have facilitated air traffic services by giving greater flexibility to aviation operators in planning and choosing preferred air routes that can lead to quicker arrivals. FRA offers enhanced system safety and efficiency, but these benefits can be outweighed by the introduction of air traffic conflicts that are geometrically more complex. Such conflicts can arise from increased number and distribution of conflict points, as well as from elevated uncertainty in aircraft maneuvering (for instance, during heading changes). Overall, these issues will make conflict detection more challenging for air traffic controllers (ATCOs). Consequently, there is a need to select ATCOs with suitably high levels of spatial orientation ability (SOA) to ensure flight safety under FRA implementation. In this study, we tested 20 participants who are eligible for ATCO job application, and found that response time-based performance on a newly developed, open access, computerized spatial orientation test (SOT) predicted time to loss of minimum separation (tLMS) performance on an air traffic conflict detection task (AT-CDT) we designed. We found this predictive relationship to be significant to a moderately large extent under scenarios with high air traffic density (raw regression coefficient = 0.58). Moreover, we demonstrated our AT-CDT as a valid test in terms of eliciting well-known mental workload and spatial learning effects. We explained these findings in light of similar or overlapping mental processes that were most likely activated optimally under task conditions featuring approximately equal numbers of outcome-relevant stimuli. We conclude by discussing the further application of the SOT to the selection of prospective ATCOs who can demonstrate high levels of conflict detection performance in FRA during training simulations. (shrink)

The issue of aftercare for participants in clinical research was explored in the context of an asthma drug trial. Although there may be financial constraints and practical difficulties with implementation, the results show that it may be feasible for clinical investigators and commercial sponsors to take on some limited responsibility for the medical care of research subjects after clinical trials. However, the ethical implications for this practice remain unclear. On the one hand, society may have a moral obligation to compensate (...) and reward some of its members who assume the risk of research subjects for the benefit of society as a whole. On the other hand, the promise of aftercare may provide an inducement to volunteers which, under certain conditions may be considered morally wrong and scientifically unsound. (shrink)

It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has been recently challenged. One challenge appeals to approximate truths. Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri argue that false-but-approximately-true propositions can be known. They provide experimental findings to show that their view enjoys intuitive support. In addition, they argue that we should reject the factive account of knowledge to avoid widespread skepticism. A second challenge, advanced by Nenad Popovic, appeals to multidimensional geometry to build (...) a case where it seems intuitive that a person knows p even though p is false. In addition, Popovic argues that we should reject the factive account of knowledge because most of us would not become widespread skeptics if we discovered that ordinary objects in our world are actually four-dimensional. In this paper, we defend the factive account of knowledge against these arguments by challenging the intuitive appeal of the cases and arguing that there is no real threat of widespread skepticism for the factive account of knowledge. (shrink)

We study the computational content of various theorems with reverse mathematical strength around Arithmetical Transfinite Recursion (ATR_0) from the point of view of computability-theoretic reducibilities, in particular Weihrauch reducibility. Our main result states that it is equally hard to construct an embedding between two given well-orderings, as it is to construct a Turing jump hierarchy on a given well-ordering. This answers a question of Marcone. We obtain a similar result for Fraïssé's conjecture restricted to well-orderings.

Hui Tzu said to Chuang Tzu, “. . .Your words ... are too big and useless, and so everyone alike spurns them!”Chuang Tzu said, “Maybe you’ve never seen a wildcat or a weasel. It crouches down and hides, watching for something to come along. It leaps and races east and west, not hesitating to go high or low—until it falls into the trap and dies in the net. Then again there’s the yak, big as a cloud covering the sky. It (...) certainly knows how to be big, though it doesn’t know how to catch rats.” 1 One could perhaps understand, if not empathize with, Hui Tzu’s impatience in the dialogue above. Hui Tzu, after all, is not alone in finding Chuang Tzu’s philosophy, which would be the thinking of the Way .. (shrink)

This paper examines Fichte's conception of the freedom of choice in Das System der Sittenlehre of 1798 as a solution to the dilemma posed by determinism and indeterminism. It show that Fichte does not simply affirm an indifferent power of voluntary choice, but demonstrates how such a power might co-exist with the measure of regularity and lawfulness we normally admit of human choices. Particular choices do not occur at random, but are based on general reasons. These reasons are in turn (...) based on the extent to which we have freely reflected on our original drive. Thus our choices can be comprehended and predicted from the point of reflection from which we choose. This does not lead to the denial of the freedom of choice, but only to rethinking it in terms of the freedom of reflection: Though we cannot choose other than what we choose from the point of reflection we occupy, we can choose other than what we choose by raising or lowering ourselves through reflection to a higher or lower point of reflection. (shrink)

While Reinhold was no doubt interested in harnessing Kantian practical reason as a rational ground for our fundamental religious convictions, it remains unclear as to whether he reserves any role for theoretical or speculative reason in moral faith, and if so, what. This paper argues that he continues to assign an important role to speculative reason in the establishment and dissemination of a “religion of reason” in his efforts across three major texts of the Jena period (namely, the 1786-87 Letters (...) on the Kantian Philosophy, the 1789 Attempt at the New Theory of the Human Power of Representation, and the 1790 first edition of Contributions to the Correction of the Misunderstandings of Previous Philosophers) to outline a “new metaphysics” that accounts for supersensible objects (God, the soul, freedom and the physical, the moral and the intelligible world) in terms of forms of reason. It shows how Reinhold develops a unified account of speculative and practical reason by extending the former’s role to include that of producing ideas that pertain to the practical postulates and narrowing the latter’s role to that of imparting objective reality and further content to the ideas. (shrink)

The best-known fact about the interaction of the Republican Roman poet Gaius Lucilius (c.180–103/102b.c.e.), the inventor of the genre of Roman verse satire, with the doctrine of Scepticism is probably a statement of Cicero: that Clitomachus the Academician dedicated a treatise to the poet (Cic.Luc. 102). Diogenes Laertius makes much of that writer's, Clitomachus’, industry (τὸ φιλόπονον, 4.67), with the comment: ‘to such lengths did his diligence (ἐπιμελείας) go that he composed more than four hundred treatises’. This phraseology surely reminds (...) those interested in Lucilius’ influence on later Latin poetry of Horace's disparaging comment,in hora saepe ducentos, | ut magnum, uersus dictabat(‘as a bravura display, he would often dictate two hundred verses in an hour’,Sat.1.4.9–10); moreover, Horace shortly afterwards calls his predecessorgarrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem(‘talkative and too lazy to bear the work of writing’, 1.4.12). Yet, a sceptical view of Horace's critique might have to think of Lucilius as hard-working, like his putative friend the Academic philosopher, Clitomachus. (shrink)

Alzheimer's disease is the most common form of dementia that gradually disrupts the brain network to impair memory, language and cognition. While the amyloid hypothesis remains the leading proposed mechanism to explain AD pathophysiology, anti-amyloid therapeutic strategies have yet to translate into useful therapies, suggesting that amyloid β-protein and its precursor, the amyloid precursor protein are but a part of the disease cascade. Further, risk of AD can be modulated by a number of factors, the most impactful being the ɛ4 (...) isoform of apolipoprotein E. A recent study reported a novel isoform-dependent transcriptional regulation of APP by apoE. These interesting new results add to the myriad of mechanisms that have been proposed to explain how apoE4 enhances AD risk, highlighting the complexities of not only apoE and AD pathophysiology, but also of disease itself. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/yd14MBdPkCY APP transcription is differentially modulated by apoE and its isoforms: how does this novel mechanism fit with the existing hypotheses? (shrink)

Sungho Choi has criticised Michael Strevens's counterexample to DavidLewis's final theory of "token" causation, causation as "influence." Iargue that, even if Choi's points are correct, Strevens's counterexampleremains useful in revealing a shortcoming of Lewis's theory. Thisshortcoming is that Lewis's theory does not properly account for*degrees* of causation. That is, even if Choi's points are correct,Lewis's theory does not capture an intuition we have about the*comparative* causal statuses of those events involved in Strevens'scounterexample (we might, for example, intuit that Sylvie's ball-firingis (...) *as much*/*more*/*less* a cause of the jar's shattering as/than isBruno's ball-firing). (shrink)

In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, variation only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is wrong. Second, even though variation in intuitions shows that (...) at least one disputant has the wrong intuition in the thought experiment, it is not evidence of unreliability of any disputant’s intuition regarding the philosophical theory being tested. So, variation in intuitions is not good evidence that one’s own intuitions are unreliable. One reply from the literature in peer disagreement is that we should conciliate if we cannot determine who is wrong. I argue that these disagreements are instead unconfirmed peer disagreements (i.e., no good reason to take or dismiss disputants as an epistemic peer, inferior or superior). I argue that if you have a strong intuition about a case, then it is rational for you to remain steadfast. Thus, variation in intuitions does not call for skepticism. (shrink)

In Schopenhauer’s thought, the will’s primacy over the intellect seems to suggest that the intellect plays no role in determining what we do. I provide an alternative picture of the intellect as actively deliberating and choosing in abstract cognition from what it passively receives from the will in natural cognition.

This paper considers what Fichte's conception of the human body as an instrument of perception entails for his radical principle of the primacy of practice. According to Fichte, perception is a function of what he calls the "articulation" of the human body, as opposed to its "organization." I first provide an interpretation of his theory of the human-bodily articulation by arguing that he construes it as a product of culture as well as nature. On this basis, I go on to (...) consider the theory's implications for perception: first, since our articulated body is the sphere of our free activity, it follows from its function as the instrument of perception that we always exercise some measure of control over what we perceive; second, because our articulated body is a product of culture, the way in which we perceive is conditioned by practical rules, precepts and laws that regulate our reciprocal interaction with nature and society. (shrink)

Does the relation of (actual) causation admit of degrees? Is it sensible to say, for example, that ‘as compared to his consuming the light beer, Clement’s consuming the moonshine was more a cause of his becoming drunk’? Suppose the answer is ‘yes’. Suppose also that country A unjustifiably ignites a lethal war with country B, and you intuit that, while most combatants of A are liable to lethal counterattack, most non-combatants of A aren’t similarly liable. Then, you might support your (...) intuition by reasoning as follows. ‘Perhaps most non-combatants of A causally contribute to A’s unjust, lethal war effort. However, unlike most combatants of A, their causal contributions are not of such a degree that makes them liable to lethal counterattack’. Such reasoning is rejected by Carolina Sartorio. This is due to the recent revealing of a certain puzzle, one which suggests to Sartorio that causation doesn’t come in degrees. Now, one motivation for Sartorio’s reaction to the aforementioned puzzle is her thought that we can, for the most part, ‘explain away’ the ‘illusion’ that causation comes in degrees. I’ll argue that Sartorio insufficiently supports her foregoing thought. Using Sartorio’s resources, we cannot (largely) ‘explain away’ the widespread appearance that causation comes in degrees. (shrink)

This essay investigates what a nuanced and revisionary interpretation of Fichte’s Critical-idealist philosophy could reveal about its impact on the philosophic thought of Friedrich Schlegel. It argues that Schlegel sees the Wissenschaftslehre through the lens of the distinction Fichte famous draws between the “spirit” (Geist) and the “letter” (Buchstaben) of a philosophy. He considers the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre to lie in its acute awareness of its own limitation as a work of art and its letter in the deductive or (...) demonstrative form it inevitably assumes upon being expounded. In the face of the discrepancy, Schlegel rejects the letter of the Wissenschaftslehre in favor of its spirit. (shrink)